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Series A, No. 94). From these bits of evidence it is safe to assume with Frazer that the kneeling position was a common one. Ploss (*Das Weib*, II, 161 [6th ed.]) informs us that this position is used in Greece as well as in other countries.

One of the objections that might be raised against this explanation is the fact that the root *ġen* is commonly used of the male, "beget." But it is frequently enough used also of the female, "bear." (And it is difficult to disbelieve the ultimate connection with the root of Skt. *jānī*, Gr. *γυνή*, Slav. *žena*, "woman," despite the conflict in the character of the initial guttural.) The probability is that "beget" was originally an extended use of "bear," for its very nature would make the phenomenon of childbirth prior in its consideration by the primitive mind to the idea of begetting.

The Bohemian word *pokoleni* seems to be formed from *koleno* after the analogy of verbal nouns belonging to verbs compounded with *po*, such as *poručeni* "a command," *postoupeni* "advancement," *posvěcení* "a consecration," etc. Its literal meaning would then be "kneeling," for in Slavic the word "to kneel" is represented by a totally different root. Is it therefore not possible that we have a word *genus* from a word *genu* because a generation in the early days of at least a considerable part of our race was a matter of getting down on the knees?

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[For the Slavic words, the *genus* use is most simply derived from the *genu* use through the medium of "bend, branch," etc. Cf. *Archiv f. Slav. Phil.*, XXX, 296; Berneker, *Slav. et. Wtb.*, p. 546.—C. D. B.]

NOTE ON ὥς ἐγῶμαι AND PLATO PROTAGORAS 336 D

μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ὥς ἐγῶμαι Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπών.

Professor Wilamowitz' comment on this *Platon* i. 138, n. 1, is: "Das eine Mal, wo Kritias das wort nimmt, 336d, ist Sokrates nicht ganz sicher, wer der Redende war. Es soll auf ihn nichts ankommen, aber ganz stumm soll er doch nicht bleiben." This may sound plausible to anyone who thinks ὥς ἐγῶμαι in literal English or German translation. In point of fact, however, this frequent Platonic phrase or idiom does not suggest uncertainty or doubt. In *Phaedo* 98 E it is employed in the confident assertion of fundamental truth: ἐπεὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα ὥς ἐγῶμαι, etc. In *Crito* 46 D it reaffirms essential Platonic moral principles. In *Cratylus* 386 C it accompanies a very positive statement of Socrates. In *Charmides* 167 E it confirms a strong inductive instance. In *Republic* 369 B it announces a theory of which Socrates has no doubt. In *Euthyphron* 7 C it supports the Platonic principle that weighing and measuring end debate.

In *Sophist* 251 C and 253 E its context is an unhesitating affirmation. It would be superfluous to write out these and many other available examples. I have no Platonic lexicon at hand, but in turning over the pages of the text the following cases catch my eye: *Protagoras* 330 D, 354 B and C, 353 E; *Phaedo* 91 C, 93 A, 106 D; *Gorgias* 452 B; *Cratylus* 431 C; *Theaetetus* 187 A, *Alcibiades* i. 106 B.

A scholar who examines these texts can have no doubt on the matter, even if he had overlooked it hitherto. It is a trifling point; but if it was worth while to base an ingenious historical interpretation on the misapprehension, it is worth while to correct it.

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THE SON OF CROESUS

In a passage familiar to many readers Herodotus (i. 85) tells the story of the son of Croesus, who, though dumb from birth (cf. i. 34), at an hour of peril to his father burst out in articulate appeal to a Persian soldier not to slay the king, and who from that time to the end of his life enjoyed the power of speech. Substantially similar accounts appear in Gellius v. 9, Valerius Maximus v. 4, ext. 6, and Solinus i. 112. The dumb prince is also mentioned by Nicolaus of Damascus (fr. 68, Müller), and seems to have become proverbial—*τοῦ Κροίσου παιδὸς σιγηλότερος*—as may be seen from Greg. Cypr. iii. 79 (*Paroem. Gr.* i. 374) and Apostolius xvii. 99 (*Paroem. Gr.* ii. 686), with which compare Lucian *Vit. Auct.* iii; *Somnium* 25; *Pro Imagin.* 20.

On the other hand, the account in Cicero (*De div.* i. 121) reads: "scribit Herodotus Croesi filium, cum esset infans, locutum, quo ostento regnum patris et domum funditus concidisse," while Pliny (*N.H.* xi. 270) says: "sed semenstris locutus est Croesi filius et in crepundiis prodigio quo totum id concidit regnum."

Between these two traditions there has been held to be inconsistency, as there clearly is between Herodotus and the form of the tale in Pliny. So Jastrow (in *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche u. Vorarbeiten*, XIV [1914], 57, n. 4) remarks: "The omen consists in the fact that the *infant* speaks as in the cases reported by Julius Obsequens In Herodotus the story is perverted through the rationalistic touch that the son of Croesus was dumb for many years but suddenly acquired the power of speech. The story loses its point by this modification. The correct form of the story is also given by Lycosthenes, *Prodigiorum ac Ostentorum Chronicon* 65.¹ The 'speaking' infant was always regarded as an ill

¹ Obviously this work by Lycosthenes (Conrad Woolfhart) in the sixteenth century cannot be regarded as strengthening in any way the testimony of Cicero; cf. Jahn's warning as to the use of Lycosthenes, in the *praefatio* to his edition of Julius Obsequens (1853), p. xvi.